Parshat Ekev 5769

Parshat Ekev 5769

Rabbi Ari Kahn

Walking Together with God

Parshat Ekev begins with what seems like a familiar dictum:

ספר דברים פרק ז

(יב) וְהָיָה עֵקֶב תִּשְׁמְעוּן אֵת הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים הָאֵלֶּה וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם וַעֲשִׂיתֶם אֹתָם וְשָׁמַר ה’ אֱלֹהֶיךָ לְךָ אֶת הַבְּרִית וְאֶת הַחֶסֶד אֲשֶׁר נִשְׁבַּע לַאֲבֹתֶיךָ:

And it will be because you heed these judgments, and safeguard and do them, that the Eternal, your Almighty God shall safeguard and uphold with you the covenant and the mercy which he swore to your fathers; D’vraim 7:12

Man is commanded to follow the commandments and to obey the Word of God. This is far from unusual; such statements are to be found many times in the Torah, and in the book of Dvarim in particular. In fact, in the verse immediately preceding this one, the concluding verse of Parshat V'etchanan, man is enjoined to follow the Torah:

דברים פרק ז

(יא) וְשָׁמַרְתָּ אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְאֶת הַחֻקִּים וְאֶת הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ הַיּוֹם לַעֲשׂוֹתָם: פ

You shall therefore safeguard the commandment(s) and the statutes and the judgments which I command you this day, to do them. D’vraim 7:11

While the division of the Torah into weekly portions is somewhat artificial, in the written text of the Torah, Parshat Ekev always begins a new paragraph, as indicated in our printed texts by the Hebrew letter “peh”, shorthand for petucha (scibal instructions to leave the line petucha, open). In other words, the two verses in question seem to say the same thing, despite the formal indication that a new idea has begun. The last verse of V'etchanan and the first verse of Ekev both are exhortations to follow the commandments of the Torah. Why, then, are they separated? Or, we might ask, what does the first verse in our present parsha add to what had already been stated in the preceding verse?

The language of our verse does not solve our quandary: the word “Ekev”, is variously translated as “come to pass”, "because of" or "as a result of"; the placement of this word here is awkward and the meaning difficult to pinpoint. Explanations of this word often rely on the relatively straightforward meaning of its three-lettered root, ayin – kuf – bet, “heel”, as in the source of our patriarch Yaakov's name. With this in mind, Rashi explains:

רש"י דברים פרק ז פסוק יב

והיה עקב תשמעון - אם המצות הקלות שאדם דש בעקביו תשמעון:

"And it will be because you heed": if you heed the 'light' commandments that a person tramples with their heel. Rashi D’vraim 7:12

What is unique about our verse is that it describes the outcome of our behavior; as a result of our heeding the Torah's pronouncements and fulfilling the commandments, God will fulfill His part in the covenant: “that the Almighty your God shall keep with you the covenant and the mercy which he swore to your fathers”. And yet, the same message could have been transmitted in far less convoluted language. Had the Torah wished to state this wonderful result in more straightforward terms, describing the ongoing relationship with God and the dynamic nature of His covenant with the Jewish People, simpler words could have been employed. Would the meaning have suffered had the common 'im' (“if”) been used – as it is later in the same parsha? “If” is the most straightforward word that connotes conditionality: 'If you obey the commandments, I will uphold the covenant," or even, “When you behave as I have commanded, the desired result will surely follow".

Rashi is sensitive to the unusual usage of ekev, and points to an additional message that is conveyed by this particular word. He speaks of the "light" commandments, simple or easy commandments that are “trampled with the heel”. Various later commentaries ponder this idea: What are these "small" mitzvot? Why would these mitzvot suffer discrimination at the hands of those who obey God's command?

The Maharal explains that these mitzvot are neglected because they are perceived as bearing minimal reward.[1] This explanation echoes a teaching found in the Ethics of the Fathers (Pirkei Avot):

משנה מסכת אבות פרק ב משנה א

והוי זהיר במצוה קלה כבחמורה שאין אתה יודע מתן שכרן של מצות

…and be careful with a light[2] precept as with a grave one, for you do not know the (calculation) of reward [for the fulfillment] of the mitzvot. Mishna Avot 2:1

Another possible understanding of these “trampled” mitzvot is that these mitzvot are, in fact, performed, but without proper intention or devotion; these are mitzvot which a person may fulfill out of habit, by rote, and without full concentration or consideration.

A third possible understanding of these "trampled" mitzvot centers around the intent of the person who fulfills the mitzva: The mitzva is performed, intentionally, but for the wrong reason. The scenario created by this understanding is one in which a prescribed act is performed, or a proscribed act avoided, but not because it is so decreed by God. The mitzva is not, in fact, "credited" to the account of the person who performed it if his or her intention was devoid of any desire to heed the Word of God.

Particular deeds are often performed for reasons of altruism, or out of some sort of self-serving motivation. In this case, the performance of the mitzva has not been trampled upon; it was fully and precisely performed. Rather, the sense of command is lacking. How is such an action to be judged? What is the nature and status of such behavior?

The Netziv, (Rabbi Naftali Zvi Yehudah Berlin), in his commentary to the Torah, writes that a mitzva is only a mitzva if the person performing the act believes he was commanded to do so. In the literal sense, the word mitzva means "command". It therefore stands to reason that a person who behaves in accordance with a Torah law but does not believe himself to be fulfilling a precise and specific command, is not, in fact, performing a “mitzva”.[3]

The question of the intention in fulfilling mitzvot is treated extensively in various Talmudic discussions. Although various opinions are offered and different conclusions are drawn for different categories of mitzvot, the Netziv clarifies a very basic underpinning of the Talmudic debate that the Sages, as well as later readers such as ourselves, might have taken for granted:[4] According to the Netziv, the entire argument is predicated upon the premise that the person performing the act believes in God and Torah.

We may better understand this in terms of our more familiar relationships: Do behaviors in interpersonal relationships require intentional effort, or is the "bottom line" what is important? If we imagine a husband handing his wife flowers, but telling her at that very moment that he does not, nor has he ever, had any feelings for her, would she still be happy to receive the flowers? Even further, the Netziv points out – the entire scenario would be incomprehensible if the man did not recognize the woman to whom he handed the flowers, had no relationship with her at all. Analogously, the sages of the Talmud debated whether any specific act requires active attention and intention, or if an absent-minded gesture is acceptable. Does the husband buy flowers out of habit? Is that enough of a reason? The Netziv points out that this entire question is predicated on there being a relationship between the person buying the flowers and the person to whom they are presented: What a person behaves in the precise manner mandated by Torah Law, but has no consciousness of God or Torah?

This question arises concerning the behavior of ethical non-Jews: If they perform the Noachide laws, but not because they are in any way cognizant of having been commanded to do so, should their gestures be interpreted as fulfillment of these seven commandments? Given the nature of these commandments, it is altogether conceivable that there are those who fulfill the commandments simply because they are decent people. If they do not believe that they were commanded to perform the specific actions, we would be hard-pressed to say that they are performing mitzvot.

The Rambam broaches this subject in his consideration of the possibility that an ethical gentile may have a share in the World to Come. Despite the fact that the majority of the seven Noachide laws are proscriptive, rather than proactive calls for specific action, the Rambam refers to “acceptance” of the Noachide laws:

רמב"ם יד החזקה - הלכות מלכים פרק ח

(יא) כל המקבל שבע מצות ונזהר לעשותן הרי זה מחסידי אומות העולם ויש לו חלק לעולם הבא והוא שיקבל אותן ויעשה אותן מפני שצוה בהן הקב"ה בתורה והודיענו על ידי משה רבינו שבני נח מקודם נצטוו בהן אבל אם עשאן מפני הכרע הדעת אין זה גר תושב ואינו מחסידי אומות העולם ולא מחכמיהם:

Whoever accepts the seven Noachide laws and is careful to fulfill them is considered a righteous gentile and has a share in the World to Come. This is so if he accepts them and performs them because the Holy One blessed be He commanded it in the Torah, and informed us via Moshe or teacher, that the Noachides were previously thus commanded. But if he did these commandments because of his own mind, he is not considered a “stranger who lives among us” nor is he a righteous gentile, nor among their wise people. Rambam, Mishne Torah, Laws of Kings and Wars chapter 8 section 11.

This is the text which is found in the printed edition, however in other texts, notably the Yemenite manuscript, the concluding sentence ends differently:

רמב"ם יד החזקה (כתב יד תימני) - הלכות מלכים ומלחמות פרק ח

(יא) כל המקבל שבע מצות ונזהר לעשותן הרי זה מחסידי אומות העולם, ויש לו חלק לעולם הבא, והוא שיקבל אותן ויעשה אותן מפני שצוה בהן הקדוש ברוך הוא בתורה והודיענו על ידי משה רבנו שבני נח מקודם נצטוו בהן, אבל אם עשאן מפני הכרע הדעת אין זה גר תושב ואינו מחסידי אומות העולם אלא מחכמיהם:

But if he did these commandments because of his own mind, he is not considered a “stranger who lives among us”, nor is he among the righteous gentiles; rather, he is considered among their wise people. Rambam Mishne Torah Laws of Kings and Wars, Yemenite Manuscript chapter 8 section 11.[5]

According to the Rambam, a mitzva performed by a non-Jew results in a “Share of the World to Come”. However, a "good deed", which may be the exact same action as a “mitzvah” but is performed independent of God-consciousness, devoid of a God-Man relationship, cannot by definition be a mitzva. To return to our earlier analogy, we may say that a loving spouse who buys flowers performs an act as means of cementing a relationship with their significant other. The person who presents flowers to a perfect stranger has acted in identical fashion, but without the awareness of the relationship, without the underlying intention to express closeness and love, the action has completely different significance. Although presenting flowers to a total stranger may, indeed, be an act of altruism that may warm another person's heart, no token passed between two strangers can compare to the understanding that is passed between two people involved in a deep and meaningful relationship. I would posit that the Rambam's formulation regarding the gentile who may indeed be wise but is not considered righteous, is akin to this altruist and the flowers presented to a stranger: While all good deeds are rewarded, not all good deeds result in a relationship with God, in the ongoing and eternal relationship that our tradition refers to as "a share in the World to Come." Only one who has a relationship with God can perform a mitzva, an act which forges and solidifies a relationship that lives beyond the confines of our limited, physical world.

What, then, of the good deeds performed by the moral atheist, Jewish or non-Jewish? What impact do these good deeds have? Perhaps some questions are best left unanswered, and we need not attempt to stand in as God’s “accountant”. Be that as it may, the word “mitzva” would hardly apply to such good deeds. Regarding such deeds as fulfillment of a commandment would be an oxymoron – from the perspective of the person performing the deed, as well as from our perspective.

Rabbi Menachem Twersky, founder of the Chernobyl dynasty (1730-1797) felt that the word 'mitzva' connotes more than “command”; he saw within it the word 'b'tzavta', which means togetherness: Every mitzva fulfilled is a point of connection between He who commands and we who are commended and who acquiesce. The result of fulfilling a mitzva is togetherness – what we have referred to elsewhere as 'a rendezvous with God'. Seen from this perspective, the question of the ethical non-believer seems simpler: The question is no longer one of accounting, but of closeness, of communication, and there is no communication when the person performing the act does not believe in God, does not believe that God has spoken, does not believe that God takes an interest in human behavior. It is impossible to perform a mitzva if there is no awareness of God's involvement in our lives; as impossible as the sound of one hand clapping, it is impossible to have a rendezvous of one.[6]

Our point of departure was Rashi's comment on the strange and impenetrable use of the word ekev in this seemingly-redundant verse. While we may not know which of the various interpretations of this particularly difficult usage to adopt, we should not overlook another component of Rashi's comments on the verse which is often ignored: While the unusual word in the verse may be “ekev”, the clause as a whole is centered around the word tishme'un - “hear”. The verse as a whole stresses the importance of hearing – according to Rashi, even the oft-trampled mitzvot. But what is meant by the word “hear”? The second half of the verse touches upon performance of the mitzva, fulfilling the commandment, as well as safeguarding the mitzva (presumably, referring to the spirit behind the prescribed actions). What, then, is the verse referring to when it commands us to "hear" or "heed"?

ספר דברים פרק ז

(יב) וְהָיָה עֵקֶב תִּשְׁמְעוּן אֵת הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים הָאֵלֶּה וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם וַעֲשִׂיתֶם אֹתָם וְשָׁמַר ה’ אֱלֹהֶיךָ לְךָ אֶת הַבְּרִית וְאֶת הַחֶסֶד אֲשֶׁר נִשְׁבַּע לַאֲבֹתֶיךָ:

 And it will be because you heed these judgments, and safeguard and do them, that the Eternal, your Almighty God shall safeguard and uphold with you the covenant and the mercy which he swore to your fathers; D’vraim 7:12

While we might be tempted to translate "heed" or "hearken" as study or learning, the Targum translates tishme'un as “acceptance”.

תרגום אונקלוס על דברים פרק ז פסוק יב

(יב) ויהי חלף די תקבלון ית דיניא האלין ותטרון ותעבדון יתהון ויטר יי אלהך לך ית קימא וית חסדא די קיים לאבהתך:

Throughout the Torah, the Targum is fairly consistent in translating “hear” as 'accept'. For example, Adam was not punished for “hearing” the words of Eve, he was punished for listening. The Targum repeatedly translates 'listened' as “accepted her words”:

בראשית פרק ג פסוק יז

וּלְאָדָם אָמַר כִּי שָׁמַעְתָּ לְקוֹל אִשְׁתֶּךָ וַתֹּאכַל מִן הָעֵץ אֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךָ לֵאמֹר לֹא תֹאכַל מִמֶּנּוּ אֲרוּרָה הָאֲדָמָה בַּעֲבוּרֶךָ בְּעִצָּבוֹן תֹּאכֲלֶנָּה כֹּל יְמֵי חַיֶּיךָ:

And to Adam he said, Because you have listened to the voice of your wife, and have eaten of the tree, of which I commanded you, saying, 'You shall not eat of it'; cursed is the ground for your sake; in sorrow shall you eat of it all the days of your life; Bereishit 3:17

אונקלוס בראשית פרק ג פסוק יז

(יז) ולאדם אמר ארי קבילתא למימר אתתך ואכלת מן אילנא דפקידתך למימר לא תיכול מניה ליטא ארעא בדילך בעמל תיכלינה כל יומי חייך:

The most famous “listening” is the Sh’ma, in which we are commanded not merely to “hear” that God is One, but to listen and internalize. This founding principle of our faith is known as Kabbalat 'Ol Malchut Shamayim, accepting the Yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven.[7]

דברים פרק ו

(ד) שְׁמַע יִשְׂרָאֵל ה’ אֱלֹהֵינוּ ה’ אֶחָד:

Hear[8], O Israel; The Eternal is our Almighty God, the Eternal is One. D’varim 4:6

Similarly, the second section recited in the Shma prayer, found at the end of our present parsha, speaks of 'listening' to the mitzvot. Our Sages refer to this as kabbalat ol mitzvot – accepting the yoke of mitzvot:

דברים פרק יא

(יג) וְהָיָה אִם שָׁמֹעַ תִּשְׁמְעוּ אֶל מִצְוֹתַי אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּה אֶתְכֶם הַיּוֹם לְאַהֲבָה אֶת ה’ אֱלֹהֵיכֶם וּלְעָבְדוֹ בְּכָל לְבַבְכֶם וּבְכָל נַפְשְׁכֶם:

And it shall come to pass, if you shall give heed diligently to my commandments which I command you this day, to love the Eternal your God, and to serve Him with all your heart and with all your soul… D’varim 11:13

אונקלוס דברים פרק יא

(יג) ויהי אם קבלא תקבלון לפקודי דאנא מפקיד יתכון יומא דין למרחם ית יי אלהכון ולמפלח קדמוהי בכל לבכון ובכל נפשכון:

When the commandments are to be accepted, what is needed is not merely passive hearing or even more active listening; we are to forge a powerful, reciprocal, eternal relationship - not a relationship of the order to which we have become accustomed in the interpersonal sphere, but by accepting God as King and accepting our own role as His servants. The type of listening called for here invites us to be sensitive to even the “minor” commandments, as servants of the King. This type of rapt attention transforms actions that we might well have performed otherwise, or actions that we might otherwise perform without conviction, zeal, or full attention,– into powerful religious experience. It is this type of listening that is our acknowledgement of our relationship with God, and it is this attentiveness that creates the meeting point for our rendezvous with God, Creator and Sustainer of the universe. This attentiveness infuses every act, no matter how small and routine, with supreme significance, for we are in the service of the King. Every commandment becomes a privilege, a sign of the trust the King has in each of his faithful servants, and an opportunity to repay that trust, deepen that trust, and become worthy of that relationship. That is why we are instructed to hear and listen specifically to the “small”, "mundane" mitzvot: When we hear in this way, allowing ourselves to concentrate on the significance of each mitzva with which we have been entrusted and reminding ourselves that these are opportunities to reach out to God who has spoken to us, no commandment will ever seem “small”.

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[1] Maharal Gur Aryeh D’vraim 7:12.

ספר גור אריה על דברים פרק ז פסוק יב

אם המצות קלות כו'. פירוש, דהוי למכתב 'עקב אשר תשמעון', כמו "עקב אשר שמע אברהם בקולי" (בראשית כו, ה), כי אצל "עקב" שייך לשון "אשר". והא דכתיב בהך פרשה (להלן ח, כ) "עקב לא תשמעון", אין ראוי לכתוב 'עקב אשר לא תשמעון', שהיה משמע שכך הוא בודאי, שכך משמע לשון "אשר", כדכתיב בפרשת ראה (להלן יא, כז) "את הברכה אשר תשמעו", ואצל הקללה (שם שם כח) לא כתיב "אשר", מוכח מזה כי לשון "אשר" משמע יותר ודאי. אבל גבי ברכה שייך בו "אשר". וראיה לזה, שהתרגום מוסיף (כאן) מלת 'די', והוא כמו "אשר". אי נמי, דדייק דלא הוי למכתב כלל "עקב", דהא כתיב (ויקרא כו, ג) "אם בחוקותי", וכיוצא בזה הרבה, ולא נאמר לשון "עקב", אלא לדרשה אתא. ואף על גב דכתיב "את המשפטים", ואין המשפטים מצות קלות (קושית הרמב"ן), אין זה קשיא, דאין מצוה חמורה בתורה שאין לה דקדוקי מצוה, ואפילו שבת שהיא חמורה מאד, יש בה דקדוקי מצוה, והם קלות:

אך קשיא, כי דרש זה רחוק מאוד מפשוטו, ואין דרך רש"י להביא אותו בפירושו. ויראה, דהכא מוכח לפי פשוטו שהכתוב מדבר מן מצות קלות, דאם לא כן - "והיה עקב" למה לי, לכתוב 'והיה אם המשפטים תשמעון', כדכתיב (שם) "אם בחוקותי תלכו", על כרחך הכתוב רצה לומר שאפילו דבר שנראה לכם שאין בו שכר כל כך - תקבלו שכר גדול עליו, כאילו אמר שדבר זה יהיה שבשביל דבר קטן יהיה לכם שכר גדול, ולכך כתיב "והיה עקב", שלשון "עקב" הוא שכר. והשתא קשיא באיזה מקום נזכר בכתוב מצות קלות, קאמר דנרמז גם כן דבר זה בלשון "עקב", מצות קלות שהאדם דש בעקב - יהיה לכם שכר גדול. והשתא כיון שקרא בלאו הכי מוכח שמדבר במצות קלות, נוכל שפיר לפרש לשון "עקב" המצות שהאדם דש בעקביו, כיון דמוכח דקרא איירי בקלות בלאו הכי:

[2] The Rambam, in his commentary to the Mishna, brings several examples of “light mitzvot”, such as being joyful on holidays, and knowledge of the Hebrew language:

רמב"ם על משנה מסכת אבות פרק ב משנה א

אחר כך אמר שראוי להזהר במצוה שייחשב בה שהיא קלה, כגון שמחת הרגל ולמידת לשון קודש.

[3] Ha’amek Davar Bamidbar 15:39

העמק דבר על במדבר פרק טו פסוק לט

ולא תתורו אחרי לבבכם ואחרי עיניכם. לימדנו בזה מעשה המצות שלא נחשבו למצוה אלא אם עושה ומאמין עכ"פ שהוא מצוה ועושה. ולאפוקי אם לבבו פונה אחרי מינות שאינו מאמין במצוה כלל. אין בעשייתו נחשב למעשה וזהו אחרי לבבכם.

[4] See Shulchan Oruch 60:4, sources and commentaries.

שולחן ערוך אורח חיים הלכות קריאת שמע סימן ס סעיף ד

י"א שאין מצות צריכות כוונה, * וי"א (ח) שצריכות כוונה * (ט) לצאת בעשיית אותה מצוה, * (י) ג [ב] וכן הלכה.

[5] Many authorities were aware of this alternate reading. See, for example, Tosfot Yom Tove Avot chapter 3, who “corrects” the text.

תוספות יום טוב מסכת אבות פרק ג

חביב אדם שנברא בצלם חבה יתירה וכו' שנאמר בצלם אלהים עשה אתהאדם - פירש"י חביב אדם שנברא בצלם. לכן מוטל עליו לעשות רצון קונו. ע"כ. ובכל אדם אמר ר"ע. וכמו שהוא הראיה שממנו הביא שהוא נאמר לבני נח לא לבני ישראל לבדם ורצה ר"ע לזכות את כל אדם אף לבני נח. ומאמר מלא אמר הרמב"ם בפ"ח מהלכות מלכים [הלכה י']. וז"ל צוה משה רבינו ע"ה מפי הגבורה לכוף את כל באי העולם לקבל מצות שנצטוו בני נח. וכל מי שלא יקבל יהרג והמקבל אותם הוא הנקרא גר תושב בכ"מ וכו' כל המקבל שבע מצות ונזהר לעשותן. הרי זה מחסידי אומות העולם ויש לו חלק לעוה"ב. והוא שיקבל אותן ויעשה אותן. מפני שצוה בהן הקב"ה בתורה. והודיענו ע"י מרע"ה שבני נח מקודם נצטוו בהן. אבל אם עשאן מפני הכרע הדעת אין זה גר תושב ואינו מחסידי אומות העולם. ולא [צ"ל אלא] מחכמיהם. עכ"ל.

ר' צדוק הכהן מלובלין - ישראל קדושים אות ז

ובאמת הוא מאס בתורה ובחר בזה רק מצד שכל אנושי ואם כן אינו כלום. לא מיבעיא דאין מקבלין שכר [נצחיי כחסידי אומות העולם שיש להם חלק לעולם הבא אבל בעולם הזה אין הקדוש ברוך הוא מקפח שכר שיחה קלה כמו שאמרו בבבא קמא (ל"ח ב) וגם על מצוות קלות שעושין אומות העולם להתייהר וכיוצא והוא חטאת להם. מכל מקום מקבלין שכר גם כן וממתינין לשבירתן עד יבוש קצירה כמו שאמרו בפרק קמא דבבא בתרא (י' ב)] שאפילו בשבע מצוות בני נח אם עשה מצד שכלן ולא לפי שהשם יתברך ציוה אין נקרא מחסידי אומות העולם אלא מחכמיהם. כמו שכתב רמב"ם בהלכות מלכים (פרק ח' הלכה י"א). אלא נענש גם כן במצוות מחודשות שעושה וכמו שכתב רמב"ם (שם פרק י' הלכה ט') דאסור לו לעשות מצוות חדשות מדעתו. והוא בכלל גוי ששבת או עסק בתורה שחייב מיתה (שם וסנהדרין נ"ט):

שו"ת מהר"ם אלשקר סימן קיז

אמר הכותב כבר פירש לנו רבינו הרב בסוף פ"ח מהלכות מלכים מה הכוונה בחסידי אומות העולם בבירור שלא יוכל שום סכל ולא מתעקש להכחיש וז"ל שם כל המקבל שבע מצות ונזהר לעשותן הרי זה מחסידי אומות העולם ויש לו חלק לע"ה והוא שיקבל אותו ויעשה אותן מפני שצוה בהן הב"ה בתורה והודיענו על ידי משה רבי' ע"ה שבני נח מקדם נצטוו בהן אבל אם עשאן מפני הכרע הדעת אין זה גר תושב ואינו מחסידי אומות העולם אלא מחכמיהם עכ"ל.

שו"ת עונג יום טוב סימן יט

ודע דלכאורה יש להקשות ע"ד רבינו שמואל שהביא הר"ן דבמכוון שלא לצאת לכ"ע לא יצא מהא דאמרינן בקידושין (דף ל"ט) ובחולין (דף קמ"ב) ר' יעקב אומר אין לך כל מצוה שבתורה שאין תחיית המתים תלוי' בה בכיבוד או"א כתיב למען ייטב לך והארכת ימים. ובשילוח הקן כתיב למען יאריכון ימיך ולמען ייטב לך הרי שאמר לו אביו להביא גוזלות ועלה לבירה ונטל את האם ושלח את הבנים ונפל מן הגג ומת היכן אריכות ימיו של זה והיכן טובתו ש"ז אלא למען ייטב לך לעולם שכולו טוב ולמען יאריכון ימיך בעולם שכולו ארוך ודלמא לא הוי הכי ר' יעקב מעשה חזא ודלמא מהרהר בעבירה הוי מחשבה רעה אין הקב"ה מצרפה למעשה ודלמא מהרהר בע"ג הוי כו' דכתיב למען תפוש את ישראל בלבם כו' וקשה לימא דלמא חישב בלבו שאינו עושה הדבר לשם מצוה אלא להנאת אביו. וכן בשילוח הקן חישב בלבו בהדיא שאינו עושה לשם מצוה אלא למדת הרחמנות כדאמרינן בברכות אתה חסת על קן ציפור וכשמכוון בפירוש שלא לשם מצוה אין כאן מצוה כלל. א"ו דאף שמחשב שלא לשם מצוה נמי הוי מצוה. ושפיר הוכיח ר' יעקב מזה דמתן שכרן של מצות בעוה"ב הוא [ועיין ברמב"ם ז"ל שכ' (בהלכות מלכים) גבי ב"נ שקיים שבע מצות מפני שדעתו נוטה לזה ולא לשם מצות בוראו אינו מחסידי אוה"ע אלא מחכמיהם דמשמע שכל העושה שלא לשם מצוה אין בזה סרך מצוה. ואפשר לומר דדוקא בב"נ אמרינן הכי ולא בישראל. וכה"ג מפלגינן (בפ"ק דר"ה) לענין סלע זו לצדקה בשביל שיחי' בני דמהני בישראל ולא בב"נ. וכן אפשר לומר במכוון שלא לצאת דבישראל מקרי מצוה ולא בב"נ. ועוד יש לחלק בין מצוה שבקום עשה לשב ואל תעשה דבשוא"ת לא הוי מצוה אלא כשמכוון לשם מצוה כדאמרינן בקידושין פ"ק גבי ר' צדוק וחביריו שישבו ולא עברו עברה מחמת מצות בוראן מעלה עליו הכתוב כאלו עשה מצוה. אבל אם לא עבר אלא מחמת משפט שכלו לא חשיב כאילו עשה מצוה ולהכי בב"נ שאין בשבע מצות דידהו קום עשה רק שוא"ת שפיר כתב הרמב"ם ז"ל שאם קיימן מחמת נטיית דעתו לא מחשב מצוה. אבל בקום עשה שעושה מעשה מחשב מצוה בכל גווני]:

שו"ת יד חנוך סימן סב

R. Chanoch Henoch ben R. Yosef David Teitelbaum 1884 - 1943.

והנה הרמב"ם ז"ל פרק השמיני מהלכות מלכים (הלכה י"א) כתב, וזה לשונו, בן נח שעשה מצוה מפני הכרע הדעת ולא מפני שציוה בהן ה' אינו מחסידי אומות העולם אלא מחכמיהם, עכ"ל. ומקורו ממדרש שוחר טוב, א"כ היה צורך לצוות אותם במצוות אלה למען יעשום מפני ציוו הקב"ה. ולקמן אבאר היטב ההבדל בין עושה מפני הכרע הדעת האנושיי והכרח ההנהגה החברתיית והמדיניית, ובין עושה דבר זה כדי לקיים מצות המלך מי שאמר והיה העולם:

[6] Sefer Me’or Enayim Parshat Baha'alotcha:

ספר מאור עינים - פרשת בהעלותך

וידבר ה' אל משה לאמר וגו' בהעלותך את הנרות אל מול פני המנורה יאירו שבעת הנרות ויעש כן אהרן וגו' פירש רש"י להגיד שבחו של אהרן שלא שינה אמרו רז"ל שכר מצוה מצוה ר"ל שהשם יתברך נתן לנו המצות כדי להדבק על ידיהם בהשם יתברך וזהו שכר מצוה הוא מצוה לשון צוותה דהיינו שנדבק על ידי בהשם יתברך ואין לך שכר גדול מזה. והנה מצוה הוא אותיות השם הוי"ה ב"ה כי השני אותיות ראשונות שהם מ"צ הם בא"ת ב"ש אותיות י"ה ולהבין זה למה החצי הראשון של השם הוא נסתר באותיות א"ת ב"ש:

[7] See Mishna Brachot 2:2

משנה מסכת ברכות פרק ב

א"ר יהושע בן קרחה למה קדמה שמע לוהיה אם שמוע אלא כדי שיקבל עליו עול מלכות שמים תחלה ואחר כך יקבל עליו עול מצות

R. Joshua B. Korhah said: why was the section of 'Hear' placed before that of "And it shall come to pass"? So that one should first accept upon himself the Yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven and then take upon himself the yoke of the commandments.

[8] Remarkably, the Targum does not even translate the word Sh’ma in this instance.

אונקלוס דברים פרק ו פסוק ד

שמע ישראל יי אלהנא יי חד:

Parshat Vetchanan

Parshat Vetchanan 5769

Rabbi Ari Kahn

Zachor and Shamor

The Book of Dvarim is also known as Mishneh Torah, translated as Deuteronomy. The practical explanation for the book's name, and for its raison d'etre, is that at the end of Moshe’s life, before taking leave of his people, Moshe saw fit to teach the generation of Israelites who would soon enter the Land of Israel. This is not the generation that left Egypt, nor are they the same people who stood at Mount Sinai. That generation perished, and soon Moshe would be "gathered in to his people" – Moshe, too, would die in the desert. The Israelites who would enter the Promised Land were of a new generation; they had been children at the time of the Exodus, or were born during the Jews' 40-year sojourn in the desert.[1] This new generation, too, must hear God’s laws. Therefore, we are not surprised to find material from the four earlier Books of the Torah repeated in the fifth book: Mishneh Torah, Deuteronomy, literally means "the repetition of the law."

One particular repetition, found in Parshat Va'etchanan, is of particular interest: The Revelation at Sinai. Parshat Va'etchanan recounts that Revelation, and restates its content, the Decalogue – or the Ten Commandments. This seminal event, and the founding principles of Judaism that were transmitted at that event, were surely worthy of repetition, and we find nothing strange in Moshe's reminder to his young audience:

דברים פרק ד

(ט) רַק הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ וּשְׁמֹר נַפְשְׁךָ מְאֹד פֶּן תִּשְׁכַּח אֶת הַדְּבָרִים אֲשֶׁר רָאוּ עֵינֶיךָ וּפֶן יָסוּרוּ מִלְּבָבְךָ כֹּל יְמֵי חַיֶּיךָ וְהוֹדַעְתָּם לְבָנֶיךָ וְלִבְנֵי בָנֶיךָ:(י) יוֹם אֲשֶׁר עָמַדְתָּ לִפְנֵי ה’ אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּחֹרֵב בֶּאֱמֹר ה’ אֵלַי הַקְהֶל לִי אֶת הָעָם וְאַשְׁמִעֵם אֶת דְּבָרָי אֲשֶׁר יִלְמְדוּן לְיִרְאָה אֹתִי כָּל הַיָּמִים אֲשֶׁר הֵם חַיִּים עַל הָאֲדָמָה וְאֶת בְּנֵיהֶם יְלַמֵּדוּן: (יא) וַתִּקְרְבוּן וַתַּעַמְדוּן תַּחַת הָהָר וְהָהָר בֹּעֵר בָּאֵשׁ עַד לֵב הַשָּׁמַיִם חֹשֶׁךְ עָנָן וַעֲרָפֶל: (יב) וַיְדַבֵּר ה’ אֲלֵיכֶם מִתּוֹךְ הָאֵשׁ קוֹל דְּבָרִים אַתֶּם שֹׁמְעִים וּתְמוּנָה אֵינְכֶם רֹאִים זוּלָתִי קוֹל: (יג) וַיַּגֵּד לָכֶם אֶת בְּרִיתוֹ אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה אֶתְכֶם לַעֲשׂוֹת עֲשֶׂרֶת הַדְּבָרִים וַיִּכְתְּבֵם עַל שְׁנֵי לֻחוֹת אֲבָנִים:

Only take heed to yourself, and keep your soul diligently, lest you forget the things which your eyes have seen, and lest they depart from your heart all the days of your life; but teach them to your sons, and to your grandsons; The day when you stood before the Almighty, Omnipotent God in Horev, when God said to me, 'Gather the People together, and I will make them hear My words, that they may learn to fear Me all the days that they shall live upon the earth, and that they may teach their children.' And you came near and stood under the mountain; and the mountain burned with fire to the heart of heaven, with darkness, clouds, and thick darkness. And God spoke to you out of the midst of the fire; you heard the sound of the words, but saw no form save a voice. And He declared to you His covenant, which He commanded you to perform, ten commandments; and He wrote them upon two tablets of stone. D’varim 4:9-13

Rather than simply reminding them of the Revelation, Moshe goes one step further; he repeats the words which echoed from Heaven – more or less. A close reading of the Ten Commandments as recorded in Parshat Va'etchanan reveals deviations from the wording of the Ten Commandments in Shmot, Parshat Yitro. Many scholars have offered explanations of these variances, each taking into account one or more of the relevant factors of time, place, experience, purpose and point of view of those hearing the speech and of the speech itself:

Moshe repeated the Ten Commandments on several occasions, the first of which was at Mount Sinai. The people recoiled from the sound of God's voice; the experience of direct communication was overwhelming, terrifying, and Moshe was called upon to transmit the Ten Commandments to the people.[2] The second time Moshe repeats the law to the People is in our present parsha. The Ibn Ezra suggests that the Ten Commandments as found in Yitro are the Words of God, while those found in Va'etchanan are the words of Moshe.[3] As evidence for this position, Ibn Ezra points to the wording of the Fourth and Fifth Commandments in Va'etchanan: “…as the Lord your God has commanded you”.[4]

The Pnei Yehoshua (Yehoshua Yaakov Falk, 1680-1756) raises a different possibility: God said the Ten Commandments twice in Yitro, each time in a different way; First God uttered all Ten Commandments simultaneously,[5] in an act of Divine Speech. Then God uttered each of the Commandments again, in a form of speech more easily recognized by human senses; the first two Commandments were spoken directly to the entire People, and when they recoiled, the rest were said exclusively to Moshe who in turn relayed the teaching to the People. The Pnei Yehoshua goes on to suggest that the two repetitions, both spoken by God, had differences. The first version is reflected in the text of Shmot, and the second, in Dvarim.[6]

Another variable that comes into play is the fact that there were two different sets of Tablets. Do the differences between Shmot and Dvarim stem from God's commandment to record different words on each set of Tablets? In Yitro, God spoke and Moshe repeated the words. While we would expect Moshe to faithfully and precisely transmit the Word of God, is it possible that Moshe, our teacher par excellence, added explanatory comments along the way? The suggestion that Moshe might have changed anything in the Torah is disturbing,[7] even bordering on heretical. Surely, we must be extremely precise: It is a tenet of Jewish faith that the entire Torah is divine, and was dictated by God to Moshe. Nonetheless, Moshe most certainly needed to explain the law in a manner that would make it accessible and understandable. This necessitated the use of different explanatory words, in order to assure that the content was understood, and unchanged. Were these explanatory words included only in the second retelling? Or does each version of the Commandments include different explanatory comments added in by Moshe, tailored to the different audiences?

In other words, what is the correlation between what God said[8], and what Moshe said? Between what God told Moshe to write in the Torah in Exodus and in Dvarim? Between what was written on the first Tablets, which were shattered, and the second Tablets, which were successfully received by the People?[9]

Each of these variables could result in a different explanation for the differences between the two versions of the Ten Commandments. But rather than plumb the depths of the possible causes or reasons for the differences, I propose we examine the differences themselves, for there is so much to be learned from them. Specifically, I would suggest that the first major, substantive difference between the two "versions" is in the Fourth Commandment; up until that point, most of the differences may be considered explanatory, with more words and explanations provided in Dvarim. In the Fourth Commandment, concerning Shabbat, the difference is not a question of details, nor a question of the language used to make the point. Here, the difference represents a new perspective altogether.

Let us compare the Fourth Commandment as it appears in Shmot and in Dvarim. In each instance there is an introductory command:

שמות פרק כ

(ז) זָכוֹר אֶת יוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת לְקַדְּשׁוֹ:

In Shmot 20,8:

 Remember (or, commemorate) the Shabbat day, to sanctify it.

דברים פרק ה

(יא) שָׁמוֹר אֶת יוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת לְקַדְּשׁוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוְּךָ ה’ אֱלֹהֶיךָ:

In Dvarim 5, 11:

Keep (or, guard) the Shabbat day to sanctify it, as the Almighty your God has commanded you.

The word 'remember', zachor, is replaced with 'guard' (or 'keep'), shamor, and the problematic “as the Almighty your God has commanded you” is tacked on. Next comes the body of the law:

שמות פרק כ

(ח) שֵׁשֶׁת יָמִים תַּעֲבֹד וְעָשִׂיתָ כָּל מְלַאכְתֶּךָ:

(ט) וְיוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי שַׁבָּת לַד' אֱלֹקֶיךָ לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה כָל מְלָאכָה אַתָּה וּבִנְךָ וּבִתֶּךָ עַבְדְּךָ וַאֲמָתְךָ וּבְהֶמְתֶּךָ וְגֵרְךָ אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ:

In Shmot 20, 8-9:

Six days shall you labor, and do all your work; But the seventh day is Shabbat of the Almighty your God; on it you shall not do any work, you, nor your son, nor your daughter, your manservant, nor your maidservant, nor your cattle, nor your stranger that is within your gates;

דברים פרק ה

(יב) שֵׁשֶׁת יָמִים תַּעֲבֹד וְעָשִׂיתָ כָּל מְלַאכְתֶּךָ:

(יג) וְיוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי שַׁבָּת לַיקֹוָק אֱלֹהֶיךָ לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה כָל מְלָאכָה אַתָּה וּבִנְךָ וּבִתֶּךָ וְעַבְדְּךָ וַאֲמָתֶךָ וְשׁוֹרְךָ וַחֲמֹרְךָ וְכָל בְּהֶמְתֶּךָ וְגֵרְךָ אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ לְמַעַן יָנוּחַ עַבְדְּךָ וַאֲמָתְךָ כָּמוֹךָ:

In Dvarim 5, 12-13:

Six days you shall labor, and do all your work; But the seventh day is Shabbat of the Almighty your God; on it you shall not do any work, you, nor your son, nor your daughter, nor your manservant, nor your maidservant, nor your ox, nor your ass, nor any of your cattle, nor your stranger who is inside your gates; that your manservant and your maidservant may rest as well as you.

The additional words in Devarim do not contradict the earlier version in any way; they provide more explanation: "that your manservant and your maidservant may rest as well as you."

The final section of the Commandment is the reason for Shabbat, and it is here that we find two divergent rationales for Sabbath observance:

שמות פרק כ

(י) כִּי שֵׁשֶׁת יָמִים עָשָׂה ה’ אֶת הַשָּׁמַיִם וְאֶת הָאָרֶץ אֶת הַיָּם וְאֶת כָּל אֲשֶׁר בָּם וַיָּנַח בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי עַל כֵּן בֵּרַךְ ה’ אֶת יוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת וַיְקַדְּשֵׁהוּ: ס

In Shmot 20, 10:

For in six days God made the heavens and earth, the sea, and all that is in them, and rested on the seventh day; therefore God blessed the Shabbat day, and sanctified it.

דברים פרק ה

(יד) וְזָכַרְתָּ כִּי עֶבֶד הָיִיתָ בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם וַיֹּצִאֲךָ ה’ אֱלֹהֶיךָ מִשָּׁם בְּיָד חֲזָקָה וּבִזְרֹעַ נְטוּיָה עַל כֵּן צִוְּךָ ה’ אֱלֹהֶיךָ לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶת יוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת: ס

In Dvarim 5, 14:

And remember that you were a servant in the land of Egypt, and that the Almighty your God brought you out from there with a mighty hand and with an outstretched arm; therefore the Almighty your God commanded you to keep the Shabbat day.

In Shmot, the rationale for Shabbat is Creation: Shabbat is a testament to our belief in the Creation and the Creator. On the other hand, in Dvarim the Shabbat is commanded as a reminder of our enslavement in Egypt, and of our liberation by God's Hand. This is no mere explanatory comment; here are two vastly different, potentially contradictory reasons for observance of Shabbat.

To summarize our findings: The introductory statements for each of the versions of this commandment use unique language to describe the active commemoration of Shabbat – "to remember", on the one hand, and "to guard", on the other. In both versions, the main body of the commandment consists of a similar list of laws, albeit more fully developed by presumably explanatory material in Dvarim. The conclusions drawn by each of the two versions seem to offer mutually exclusive philosophical underpinnings for the Shabbat.

Most traditional commentaries focused on the first of these differences, the terms shamor and zachor, 'guard' and 'remember' ('commemorate'), and they refer us to the nature of Divine Speech: zachor and shamor were uttered simultaneously, in a way that human speech is incapable of imitating.

תלמוד בבלי מסכת שבועות דף כ עמוד ב

כדתניא: (שמות כ') זכור (דברים ה') ושמור בדיבור אחד נאמרו, מה שאין יכול הפה לדבר, ומה שאין האוזן יכול לשמוע.

Zachor (Shmot 20) and shamor (Devarim 5) were pronounced in a single utterance, — an utterance which the mouth cannot utter, nor the ear hear. Talmud Bavli - Shevu'ot 20b

One may ask, which of the words “zachor and shamor” was actually spoken by God; the Talmud’s answer is that both are Divine – and were said in a Divine fashion.

These two words represent two different concepts: Technically, remembering is a cerebral act which may be performed at any time during the week - on Shabbat, before Shabbat, or after Shabbat. Therefore, our Sages considered preparations for Shabbat as part and parcel of the process of "remembering" or "commemoration". Similarly, reciting the Kiddush is, according to some rabbinic opinions, a fulfillment of zachor - “Remember the Shabbat day, to sanctify it”. On the other hand, “guarding the Shabbat” is associated with avoiding prohibited actions.

Upon analysis, each of these aspects of Shabbat is incomplete. We can easily imagine a 24-hour period in which we do no creative activity, a sterile non-working day in which we have indeed fulfilled the commandment of shamor to the letter, without actually having observed Shabbat:

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עבודה זרה דף ג עמוד א

מי שטרח בערב שבת יאכל בשבת, מי שלא טרח בערב שבת מהיכן יאכל בשבת?

He who took trouble [to prepare] on the eve of Shabbat will eat on Shabbat, but he who has not troubled on the eve of Shabbat, what shall he eat on the Shabbat? Talmud Bavli Avoda Zara 3a

Similarly, one may prepare for Shabbat and not keep Shabbat – preparing all his needs before sundown, even reciting Kiddush, yet continuing all his creative workday pursuits on the seventh day itself. The two aspects of Shabbat are two sides of the same coin. Each aspect is incomplete without the other; together they create a complete, sanctified day of rest. God uttered “zachor and shamor” simultaneously.

And yet, this concept of Divine, simultaneous transmission of the two concepts, zachor and shamor, does not provide an all-encompassing answer. We might yet ask why one version was recorded in the Book of Shmot and the other in the book of Dvarim. Furthermore, we have not solved the dissonance between the concluding sections of the Commandment. My teacher and Rebbi, Rabbi Yosef Soloveitchik, addressed these problems, and offered a deep philosophical insight: In reality, the two different rationales for Shabbat do not contradict one another. Rather, they teach the same law from two different vantage points. The formulation in Shmot states: “For in six days God made the heavens and the earth, the sea, and all that is in them, and rested on the seventh day; therefore God blessed the Shabbat day, and sanctified it.” There is one thing missing here – namely, man. What does man have to do with this? Why should humankind keep Shabbat? Moreover, if Shabbat exists simply because God created, this law should be universal, and not apply only to members of the Covenant, to Jews alone.[10] This Commandment, Rabbi Soloveitchik pointed out, is theocentric, reflecting God's perspective. The seventh day is holy because God created for six days and then desisted from creating. This is echoed in the verse in Bereishit, uttered at the very dawn of creation:

בראשית פרק ב

(ג) וַיְבָרֶךְ אֱלֹהִים אֶת יוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי וַיְקַדֵּשׁ אֹתוֹ כִּי בוֹ שָׁבַת מִכָּל מְלַאכְתּוֹ אֲשֶׁר בָּרָא אֱלֹהִים לַעֲשׂוֹת: פ

And God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it; because on it He rested from all His work which God created to make. Bereishit 2:3

The fact that God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it does not necessarily affect man; only when man is commanded to keep that day in a similar or imitative fashion is he brought into the frame, into God's frame of reference, as it were.

On the other hand, the rationale for Shabbat as stated in Dvarim is of a totally different order, drawn from a totally different sphere: We were enslaved, and God rescued us. “And remember that you were a servant in the land of Egypt, and that the Almighty your God brought you out from there with a mighty hand and with an outstretched arm; therefore the Almighty your God commanded you to keep the Shabbat day.” This formulation is homocentric. The former slaves are addressed in a particularly compelling way: As slaves, they had no freedom. Now, as free men and women, they are free every day. They have been given all seven days of the week to pursue their individuality, and with this Commandment, God asks that they put aside one-seventh of their gift in return. Seen from this perspective, Shabbat becomes a moral imperative for those whose shackles were broken, homage to their liberator.

The two rationales are not contradictory; one speaks from God's perspective, teaching us that the seventh day is holy and unique. The other speaks from the human perspective, requiring man to rest as well. Had it not been for the first rationale, man would be able to choose his own day of rest; each and every day would be an equally valid candidate, and no one day would have religious superiority over the others. On the other hand, with only the first formulation, man would remain outside the picture; man would have no part in the sanctity of the seventh day, just as he was not a party to Creation.

Both of these perspectives were taught by God, simultaneously, at Sinai. Yet each was recorded, emphasized, at different junctures in the history of the Jewish People. The generation that left Egypt would certainly have no trouble embracing the idea that one day each week should be a day of rest. These former slaves may have perceived this Commandment primarily as a social law instituted to protect workers' rights and prevent future enslavement. Therefore, the generation that left Egypt, the generation of liberated slaves that stood at Sinai, was taught about the other reason for Shabbat: This day is hallowed because of Creation, and by emulating God and keeping the Shabbat we forge a powerful, holy relationship with Him.

The generation that stood poised to enter the Land of Israel knew neither work nor slavery. It was this generation that needed to hear about the human side of Shabbat. They had to be taught that the seventh day is not exclusively Divine in nature. The human and social implications of Shabbat would not have been intuitively understood by those who were sustained by miracles for forty years.

And what of us, the generations who read the words of the Torah millennia later? We are privileged to see both aspects transmitted in the text we have received. We have a multi-faceted Written and Oral Tradition which illuminates at least two sides of Shabbat - the human and the Divine. By preparing for Shabbat during the week and sanctifying the seventh day of each week, we can elevate ourselves and enjoy our own rendezvous with God.

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[1] See Chzkuni Dvarim 5:1.

חזקוני על דברים פרק ה פסוק א

(א) אל כל ישראל - להשמיעם עשרת הדברות לנולדים אחר מתן תורה

[2] See Shmot 20:16, which is explained by Dvarim 5:4-6

 Shmot 20:16. And they said to Moses, Speak with us, and we will hear; but let not God speak with us, lest we die.

Dvarim 5:4-6 God talked with you face to face in the mount out of the midst of the fire, 5. I stood between God and you at that time, to tell you the Word of God; for you were afraid because of the fire, and went not up into the mount, saying, 6. I am the Almighty your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, from the house of slavery…

[3] Ibn Ezra Shmot 20:1, the Pnei Yehoshua, op cit, also makes this suggestion.

אבן עזרא שמות (הפירוש הארוך) פרק כ פסוק א

לא כאשר אמר הגאון, כי זכור הוא בלוח האחד, ושמור בלוח השני, ועשרת הדברים הכתובים בפ' ואתחנן הם דברי משה. והראיה הגמורה ששם כתוב פעמים כאשר צוך ה' אלהיך.

[4] See Hizkuni, who makes a similar observation, but notes other words as his evidence:

חזקוני על דברים פרק ה פסוק יח

מתחלת אנכי עד ולשומרי מצותי אין בין דברות ראשונות לשניות שום שינוי לפי שהקב"ה חזר ופירשם כמו שמפורש בפרשת יתרו ולא רצה משה אפי' בפרשה זו לשנות בהם שום דבר. אבל השאר שחזר משה ופירשם אין חששא בשנוי המלות אחרי שהם שוות בטעם. וזה הכלל כל דבר שינוי במקרא תמצא בפעם שנית מלות שונות אך הטעם שוה, ומדברת לא תשא שאין בה שינוי אין להקפיד כי כך היה המקרא. ועשרת הדברות שבפרשת יתרו הם דברי הקב"ה בלי תוספת ומגרעת לבד למען ייטב לך כמו שפירש"י והם לבדם הכתובות על לוחות הברית. ואותם שבפרשה זו הם הם דברי משה וכאן סדרן משה אחר סברת הבחורים שתחלה חומדים אשה ואח"כ בית ואח"כ עבד ואמה ואח"כ שדות וחמורים. ובפרשת יתרו סדרם הקב"ה על סברת דעת אנשי חכמה שקונים תחלה בית ואח"כ אשה ואח"כ עבד ואמה ואח"כ שור וחמור.

[5] As per the comments of Rashi Shmot 20:1.

[6] The Pnie Yehoshua commentary to Baba Kamma 55a.

פני יהושע מסכת בבא קמא דף נה עמוד א

עוד מצאתי שהקב"ה בעצמו הגיד שני פעמים העשרת הדברות בראשונה אמר כל הדברים בדיבור אחד ואח"כ חזר ופרשם ומזה הטעם נאמרו פעמים בתורה בפרשת יתרו ובפרשת ואתחנן והשינוי ג"כ היה באמירת הקב"ה בעצמו

[7] See The Pnie Yehoshua commentary to Baba Kamma 55a

פני יהושע מסכת בבא קמא דף נה עמוד א

אמר לו עד שאתה שואלני למה וכו' שאלני אם נאמר בהם טוב או לאו שאיני יודע אם נאמר וכו'. הנה כל הקורא ישתומם על ככה וכי גברא רבא כר' חייא בר אבא לא היה יודע חלילה מה שהתנוקות של בית רבן יודעים שלא אמר טוב בדברות ראשונות ובאחרונות כתיב ואי משום דלשון טוב ממש לא כתיב אמאי קאמר שאינו יודע ועוד דנראה כפל הלשון שאלני אם נאמר וכו' שאיני יודע אם נאמר.

[8] The Chizkuni says, "That which God repeated (i.e., the first two Commandments) Moshe taught faithfully, for they were explained by God, and that which was explained by Moshe (the remaining eight Commandments) is where Moshe needed to add his own explanations," hence there are no differences between the first two commandments in Shmot and Devarim.

חזקוני על דברים פרק ה פסוק יח

מתחלת אנכי עד ולשומרי מצותי אין בין דברות ראשונות לשניות שום שינוי לפי שהקב"ה חזר ופירשם כמו שמפורש בפרשת יתרו ולא רצה משה אפי' בפרשה זו לשנות בהם שום דבר. אבל השאר שחזר משה ופירשם אין חששא בשנוי המלות אחרי שהם שוות בטעם. וזה הכלל כל דבר שינוי במקרא תמצא בפעם שנית מלות שונות אך הטעם שוה, ומדברת לא תשא שאין בה שינוי אין להקפיד כי כך היה המקרא.

[9] See Rabbenu Bachya, Bereishit, 18:19 whose overall principle is that the Commandments as they were spoken should be identical to what was written.

רבנו בחיי על בראשית פרק יח פסוק יט

כתב רבינו חננאל ז"ל נעשו דברי האבות בקבלה בלא כתיבה בתורה כמו תורה הכתובה, ומכאן אתה למד כי המשנה שהיא סידורה בהגדת אבות לבנים היא קבלה שחייבים לשמור דבריהם כחיוב דברי תורה הכתובים, שזה וזה שוים, שהרי עשרת הדברות נשמעו מפי הגבורה ונכתבו מפי הנביא ע"ה ושאר התורה נכתבה מפי הנביא, וכשם שאין הפרש בין המצוות שהן בשמיעה ובין המצוות שהן בכתיבה, כך אין הפרש בין המצוות שהן בכתיבה ובין המצוות שהן בקבלה שהכל שוין, עד כאן:

[10] The Talmud Sanhedrin 58b sees a non-Jew who keeps Shabbat as breaking a law rather than performing a wonderful deed.

תלמוד בבלי מסכת סנהדרין דף נח עמוד ב

ואמר ריש לקיש: נכרי ששבת - חייב מיתה, שנאמר +בראשית ח'+ ויום ולילה לא ישבתו. ואמר מר: אזהרה שלהן זו היא מיתתן. אמר רבינא: אפילו שני בשבת.